The paper characterises the nonmonotonic inference relation associated with the stable model semantics for logic programs as follows: a formula is entailed by a program in the stable model semantics if and only if it belongs to every intuitionisticaily complete and consistent extension of the program formed by adding only negated atoms. In place of intuitionistic logic, any proper intermediate logic can be used.
Introduction
The stabh, model semantics lbr logic programs, due to Geifond and Lifschitz [8] , gives rise to a natural (sceptical) nonmonotonic inference relation that has been widely investigated over the past ten years since its inception. Despite the wealth of results and insights obtained, stable model inference (in the sequel just stable fl~-ference) remains to some extent an enigma. It has been shown to be closely related to Reiter's default logic [8] , to Moore's autoepistemic logic and to other systems of nonmonotonic reasoning (see e.g. [16, 19, 23 ]) yet, until recently, a simple, non-modal, logical characterisatlon of stable inference, e.g. in terms of minimal models, was elusive. The downside has been that it has not always proved easy to compare stable inference with other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning, particularly those based on preferential models: and there is, even today, no general agreement about how stable inference should be extended, if at all, to encompass first-order theories or other classes of theories more general than logic programs. In this note we extend the work of two earlier papers, [24, 25] , in order to obtain an extremely simple, logical characterisation of stable models and the stable inference relation. It is applicable to disjunctive as well as normal logic programs, and, with minor modification, to logic programs containing an additional, 'strong' negation operator. Our approach differs from other declarative, logical characterisations of stable inference mainly in the following ways. First, the expressions ('clauses' or 'rules') of logic programs are sometimes interpreted as inference rules (as in [22] ) or as Gentzen sequents (as in [1]); we interpret them as ordinary logical formulas whose main connective is implication. Secondly, the notion of model used to characterise stable inference is quite often an ad hoc construction, not explicitly related to an~,' ordinary notion of logical model (as in the case of 'minimal model' in [3] or 'unfounded-free set' in [15] ): we use a standard notion of model, familiar from the logic literature. Thirdly, unlike the approaches taken in e.g. [16, 19, 23] , ours is based on a well-known alternative to classical logic, rather than an epistemic or modal extension of classical logic. Lastly, unlike all the above, our characterisations of stable inference are independent of the restricted syntax of logic programs and can therefore be used to formulate more general, extended concepts of stable reasoning, ~ay tbr first-order theories. 3
As a foretaste, let me summarise and illustrate the main result of the paper. When we reason classically from theory//, we reason in effect from the complete consistent extensions of the theory, i.e. from thee ries //' such that/7 c_//' and H' is (consistent and) complete in the sense that either//i-tp or//' k--,~o, but not both, for any sentence tO in the language of the theory. The reason is that, classically, we regard a sentence ~ as being a logical consequence of H if it is true in all models of H. But each of the latter defines a consistent and complete extension of H, and each model of a consistent and complete extension of H is in turn a model of H. So the property that ~ is true in all models of H is equivalent to the condiaon that ~ belongs to every consistent and complete extension of H. The latter characterises therefore ordinary, monotonic inference in ~:lassical logic. But what hap~'¢ns now if we alter the underlying logic, say by changing the notion of model and d.:civability, in particular to one in which the excluded n, iddle (¢p v -~p) is no longer ~ did? in that case, not every model will determine a complete theory, so we should expect that reasoning from complete extensions will now be stronger than reasoning from all models. Consider the simple propositional theory//comprising a single sentence
where .4, B are distinct atoms. Classically there are three complete extensions, defined by the deductive closure of {A,-~B}, of {B,-,A}, and of {A,B}, respectively. Each contains the disjunction :4 v B) which is therefore a consequence of H and indeed equivalent to it. By contrast, in intuitionistic logic/7 does not derive A v B, though this sentence holds in each of the intuitionistically complete extensions of H, determined once again by {,4,-~B} by {B,-,A} and by {A,B}, respectively. It follows that
The approach taken in [23] is also quite general, since it is based on a recursive tr~mslation of logical l'ormulas into m~lal logic.
inference based on the intuitionisticaUy complete extensions of a theory is, in general, stronger than ordinary intuitionistic inference.
We By contrast no consistent extension of//by negated atoms will intuitionistically derive//:. In particular, intuitionistically,//u {-~} derives not A but only the weaker statement, -,-,A. We have now fully captured stable inference: an atom A is a stable consequence of a theory//if and only if it belongs to every intuitionistically consistent and complete extension of H obtained by adding negated atoms. In turn, a stable model of/7 is precisely the collection of atoms true in such an intuitionistically consistent and complete extension of H. ~ Note that this conforms well with the idea that stable inference aims at providing a notion of negation-by-default. We are allowed to assume any negated atoms by default, as long as the resulting extension of the theory is consistent, but we do not jump directly to any default assumptions about positive atoms. We keep adding negated atoms to the theory until we reach a point where all questions are decided (completeness). Since not all theories can be completed in this manner merely by the addition of negated atoms, there are cases where no stable, models exist at all.
Note too that we cannot relax either of the key restrictions here. If we were to admit extensions formed by adding positive atoms, then, in the example above, /7, would be an admissible extension of ll, and B would no longer be stably derivable.
Similarly, if we used classical logic to define deductive closures, we could again obtain//2 merely by adding the negated atom -,B to//and closing under classical consequence. As we shall see later, we are not actually forced to choose intuitionistic logic, as there is a range of nonclassical logics that are equally admissible.
Lastly, let us see how nonmonotonicity arises in stable inference. Consider the theory/7' lbrmed by adding to H the sentence A V C, where C is another distinct atom. There are now two complete extensions of H obtained by adding negated atoms. Adding to//'-,A derives B by detachment and also C by disjunctive syllogism, yielding an intuitionistically consistent and complete theory. Adding to II'-,C derives, again by disjunctive syllogism, A, and so is also complete. So there are now two stable models Whereas B was derivable from//in the absence of any evidence for A, it is no longer derivable from ll', since the statement A v C now provides evidence for A.
Preliminaries
This section reviews the main definitions and results needed tbr the remainder of the paper.
Logic programs
First let me recall the syntax of logic programs. I use standard logical notation, rather than the special notation often employed in logic programming. In the setting of disjunctive logic programs, program formulas are built-up from atomic formulas using the logical constants: A, V, --+, -,, standing respectively for conjunction, disjunction, implication, and negation. Negation is often denoted by the symbol 'not' and referred to as negation-as-failure or negation-by-default. The nonlogical v~cabulary comprises a fixed set of predicate symbols (no function symbols) and a nonempty set of names. This language will be left implicit throughout.
Program formulas with free variables are treated as shorthand for the set of their ground instances, so that a logic program can be represented as a collection H of closed program formulas having the following form
where A, and Bj are ground (closed) atoms. These formulas are often called rules and written in a different notation, actually back-to-front: but the form is always the same. There is a single arrow, preceded by conjunctions of atoms and negated atoms, and followed by a disjunction of atoms. We may have m or n zero, or m = n:. but we always have k >I I. Given a program II, we denote by .~' the Herbrand base of H, i.e. the set of all atoms in the language of H. We use ,g-to denote the collection of all negated atoms in the language of H, i.
e. ,r/-= {-,A:A E ,~}.
Stable models were actually defined for the case where k = !, so-called normal programs. But the definition was quickly generalised to cover programs with formulas of type (2.1) in [9, 26] : as well as programs containing a new, strong or explicit negation operator. For reasons of space we do not repeat here the definition of stable models and their generalisation (answer sets): the reader is referred instead to [8, 9] .
hm¢itionistic h~gic
Classical logic is based on the (classical) notion of truth, whereby every proposition is either true or false, independent of our knowledge of its truth-value, in constructive reasoning this principle (of tertimn mm datur) is rejected, and logic is built upon the notion of (constructive) proqf The standard formalisation of the logic of constructive reasoning is due to Heyting [12] , and called imuitionistic logic. We denote it by H. in intuitionistic logic, terms and formulas are built-up in the usual manner, usiag the logical constants of H: ^, v, --, --, and the quantifiers 3, V. However, one explains the meaning of the connectives and quantifiers, not in terms of classical truth-conditions, but in terms of constructions acting on proofs. There are many variations on this ~,'xplanation, which, when made sufficiently precise, lead to logical calculi equivalent Io Heyting's (see any standard text, e.g. [5] ) lntuitionistic logic can readily be presented in any of the usual 'deductive' styles, e.g. as a tableau system, a natural deduction ~ystem or as a Gentzen-style sequent calculous. For example, the sequent calculus for H restricts sequents on the right to single formulas: the natural deduction rules follow those of classical logic, except that the classical rule redtwtio ad absurdum is omitted. H is a proper subsystem of classical logic: every intuitionistically valid tbrmula is also classically valid, but not conversely. The derivability relation for H will be d'moted by I--H.
There are several types of semantics for intuitionistic logic. We mention here only the method of Kripke models, also known as possible worlds semantics. Formally, one starts with a so-called Kripke frame :F, where 
(we omit here the semantics of quantification).
A formula tp is true in a Kripke model .//at world w, in symbols .//, w ~ tp, iff tp E i(w). tp is true in a Kripke model .¢/, in symbols ./! ~ tp, if it is true at all worlds in .11. A formula tp is said to be valid, in symbols, ~H tp, if it is true in all Kripke models, tp is said to be an H-consequence of a set//of formulas, written/-/~n tp, iff for all models .¢/and any world w E .// ..... //, W t':'--/7 ~ ,//, 14) ~ (D' 4 The Kripke semantics is complete for H in the sense that for all H and tp /7 ~'n tp iff /7 ~n tp.
(2.2)
We use Oot(H) to denote the set of all H-consequences of a theory H. and we denote by Th(.J#) the set ofall sentences true in a Kripke model.//. Two models.//and .~1' are said to be equivalent if Th(.#) = Th(.I ').
By regarding a stable model as a one-world Kripke model, we can also use the above semantics to define what it means Ibr a formula tp to be true in a stable m,~del .,#. Then we can define stable inference or entailment by saying that a Ibrmula ~p is entailed by a program/7 if tp is true in every stable model of/7.
b~termediate logics
We shall also consider intermediaw logics, obtainedby adding additional axioms to H; they are complete wrt a generalised notion of Kripke frame. An intermediate logic is called proper if it is strictly contained in classical logic. In the laltice of intermediate propositional logics (extensively investigated in the literature) classical logic has a unique lower cover which is the supremum of all proper intermediate logics. 5 This greatest proper intermediate logic I shall denote by J, and its corresponding consequence operation by Cnj. It is often referred to as the logic of"here-and-there", since it is characterised by linear Kripke frames having precisely two elements or worlds: 'here' and "there'. J is also characterised by the three element Heyting algebra, and is known by a variety of other names, including the Smetanich logic, and the logic of 'present and future'. Truth tables for J were already given by Heyting [12] , and the logic was further used by G/bdel in a paper of 1932, [10, 11] (hence it is sometimes known as Grdel's 3-valued logic). However, it was apparently first axiomatised by Lukasiewicz [17] . He characterised J by adding to H the axiom schema -.
-.
He also showed that disjunction is definable in J. 6 An algebraic characterisation of J is straightlbrward (see e.g. [14] ); for present purposes, however, it is more practical to use the Kripke-model characterisation. This logic forms the basis for equilibrium reasoning, to be discussed below.
Negation stability
In [25] we introduced the following notion of negation-stability, by analogy to the familiar (modal or epistemic) concept of stability, due to Stalnaker [28] and McDermott and Doyle [20] . Let L be an ordinary (monotonic) logic with inference operation CL. Assume the language of L includes the negation sign, '--,'. Let H be a set of L-sentences. Then, we say that a set E of L-sentences is an L-negation-stable extension of//iff E = CL(II U {-,p: <p ¢' E}).
(2.3)
Now an inference relation I ~ can be said to be ne:zation-stahle over L if H I~, q~ holds if and only if ~p belongs to every L-negation-stable extension of H. In this manner we regard stability not, as is customary, as a condition on beliefs but simply as a condition on the negation operator, '-,'.
Equilibrium logic
Let J be the Smetanich logic of here-and-there. Then J is determined by Kripke models based on the 2-element, 'here-and-there' frame. Each J-model can be r~pre-sented as a structure/{h, t}, <~, i), where the worlds h and t are reflexive, and h ~< t. For any world h~ we use the corresponding upper-case letter H~ to denote the set of all atoms true at h,: i.e. we set H~ = {A:~ ~ i(h~)}. For a world h, we often write 'h, [:--¢', instead of'¢ ~ i(h~)'. Note tt, at for any such model ({h,t}, ~< ,i) we always have H c_ T. A model ({h, t}, ~< ,i) may also be represented simply by the pair (H. T). The following concepts are taken from [24] .
s An excellent general source of intblmation on intermediate propositional logics is [4]. 6 Smetanich studied the logic J in [25'] . Important results about the logic can also be found in 1"!8].
Definition 2.1. A model ({h, t}, ~<, V) of H is said to be h-minimal over tiff for every model ({h', t'}, ~<, V) of/7, whenever T' = T and H' c_ H, then H' = H. Definition 2.2. A model ({h, t}, <~, V) of/7 is said to be an equilibrium model of/7 iff it is h-minimal over t and H = T.
Thus an equilibrium model is a model ({h, t}, ~<, V) in which H = T and no other model verifying the same atoms at its t-world verifies fewer atoms at its h-world. Equivalently, an equilibrium model is one in which there are no undecidable atoms and no other model falsifies precisely the same atoms while verifying fewer atoms. Clearly an equilibrium model is equivalent to a one-element model. Definition 2.3. A sentence tp is said to be an equilibrium consequence of a theory/7, in symbols/7 I"e tp, iff~t" ~ tp, for every equilibrium model .A r~" of 17. A theory E such that/7 c_ E is said to be an equilibrium expansion of/7, if E = Th(,;¢'), for some equilibrium model .A" of/7.
Equilibrium logic is the logic determined by the equilibrium consequences of a theory. We now recall the main result of [25] , that equilibrium reasoning coincides with negation-stable reasoning over J.
Proposition 2.4 [25]. For any theory II, a consistent extension E of 11 is an equilibrium expansion of [I if and only if it is a J-negation-stable extension of/7.
The relevance of this to stable inference in the context of logic programs is made clear by the following result from [24] Proposition 2.5 [24] .
Let 11 be a logic program. A set H of atoms is a stahh, model of I1 if and only ([H is the set q/'a~'oms true in some equilibrium model of/7.
Below, we shall sometimes refer to a stable model of a program as an equilibrium model .//' and sometimes as the set of atoms true in an equilibrium model./,,', i.e. as the set ~ N Th(.¢/). This ambiguity should be quite harmless however. In virtue of the above, negation-stability yields a defining characteristic tbr stable inference. We can therefore re-express the notion of stable model as follows
Proposition 2.6. For any logic program II, a set S of atoms is a stable model of 17 (if" S = E f3 .;~a, for some J-negation-stable extension E of H.

Main result
In this section we extend the above results. First, we can rephrase Proposition 2.4 by saying that ~¢[ is an equilibi'ium model of II iff rh(.l/) = Cnj(n u ,p rh(.a) } ).
(3.1)
Our next step will be to show thaL if//is a logic program, then the same Eq. (3.1) holds where J is replaced by intuitionistic logic, H. We first show that E = Th(d/) for some equilibrium model ~# of/7. By consistency, for each formula ~o, ~peE ~-¢EE. Since E forms a complete theory, all Kripke-models of E are equivalent (i.e. validate the same sentences). Then clearly for any here-and-there models ({h,t}, ~< ,i) and ({h',t'}, ~ ,i) of E, we must have H = H', since the models verify the same atoms. Similarly, since by negation-stability over H every model of E verifies -~-~¢p--, ~p, for every ~p, we must have T = T' = H. It remains to show that, among models of H, h is h-minimal over t. To this end, consider any model ({h',t'}, ~< ,i) of H, such that T' = T and H' c_ H. Now, for any sentence ¢p, h' ~ -~p iff t' ~ ~p. Hence, since T' = T, E is negation-stable and/{h,t}, ~< ,i) ~ E, we have
¢p ~ E =~ t ~ rp :=~ t' ~ rp =~ h' ~ -~p.
Consequently, ({h',t'}, ~< ,i) ~ H u {-,¢p: ¢p ~ E}, and so H' = H. It follows that ({h,t}, <~ ,i) is an equilibrium model of H. Conversely, suppose that g = (H, T)
is an equilibrium model of/7. Then, by Eq. From Eq. (3.3) we can coaclude that no world in .//' verifies more than the atoms in 7'. From Eq. (3.4) we know that, by the truth-conditions for -,-,A, for any atom A in 7' and any world w E W, in ..g' d eventually becomes true on every chain ascending from w. Since this holds for all A E T, it follows that every chain ascending from w eventually verifies precisely T. Take any world w E W and let w' be any successor of w o:erifying exactly T. Since every successor of w' also verifies precisely T, w' can be considered a one-world Kripke model of/7. Now form the substructure, t of.//' consisting solely of w and ,tJ, with relation <~ and assignment i restricted to (w,,4). We argue that .4~'= ({w, w'}, <~ ,i) is a model of/7. First, X, ~4 ~ H, tbr the reason just given. So we need to show that ./i ~". w I=-/7. What we know is that .... //', w ~/7, since .... //' is a model of /7. But .g', w ~/7 implies that for all formulas in/7, 
. For any logic program/7, a set S of atoms is a stable model of~7 if and only if S = E N .~ ]br some H-negation-stable extension E of/7, i.e. where
E = u E}).
As usual, a theory H is L-complete (L a logic) if and only it" tbr every formula ¢p, either tp or --,tp is L-derivable from/7.
We state a slight strengthening of Propo,.dtion 3. I.
Proposition 3.3. Let 11 be a hJgic program. E is an H-negation stabh, extension of
H iff E = Cnn(HU {-~A C .Y/:A ¢. E})
This brings us to the central result. 
Default explanations
It is quite natural to reformulate the concept of stable inference within an explanation-theoretic setting. Normally in the logic of explanation one assumes there is a theory II, an observed fact 0 (cal!edthe.e.vplanm~dum) to be explained, and an explanatory hypothesis E (usually known as the explanans and often taking the form of a conjunction of atomic observations) such that
lIuE~-O.
In the case of logic programs with a notion of negation-by-default or negation-asfailure, we can imagine an analogous concept of default explanation, where the default explanans E is no longer a collection of observed facts but rather a collection of negated atoms that are assumed to hold by default in the absence of contrary evidence.
Without loss of generality, we can also assume that a potential default explanans is actually generated by its complement set of positive atoms. We always assume a background theory, or logic program H, and logical entailment is taken to be intu. ~tionistic. So we can say that a set of atoms X provides a default explanation of an atomic I'ormula .,! iff rlu { -~o: o ¢ x} ~-. .~, X is then called the &~limlt exphmans of A wrt //. Notice that, although we arc assuming that what is not in X is false (by default}, we make no formal assumption about the members of X being true: and an atom in X may or may not be default explained by X itself.
For any set X of atoms, define X" := {A E .~': X is a deiault explanans of .4 }.
X" can therefore be regarded as something like the {default) explanatory content or jbrce of X. The following corollary of the previous propositions is straightforward. So, in particular, stable models are self-explanatory, and a stable consequence of H is a formula default explained by all self-explanatory detault explanans.
Related work
']?he present paper was inspired by the well-known work of Eshghi and Kowalski [7] , developing an abductive framework for logic programming. In particular, they relate the stable models of a normal program/7 to certain abductive extensions of a transformation of/7 in which negation (as failure) is removed. Eshghi and Kowalski already isolated two key features of stable models: that (besides consistency) a notion of completeness is involved, and that what should be added to the program (in their terminology, the abducibles) should correspond essentially to negated atoms. Their use of classical logic, however, leads to a much less direct and straightforward formulation of stability. The present account can be considered a simplification of theirs, as well as a generalisation to disjunction and strong negation (see below). For a survey of further work on abductive frameworks for logic programming, see [13] .
Recently, Niemelii and Simons [22] have characterised the stable models of normal programs using a tbrm of complete extensions of programs by negated atoms. Once again, they employ classical logic, and are led accordingly to a different formulation of the completeness condition. However, unlike Eshghi and Kowalski, they do not eliminate negation by adding new predicates to the language; rather they treat program clauses not as logical formulas but as inference rules. Mathematically, their characterisation is rather powerful, as it leads naturally to the design of efficient algorithms for computing stable models and stable consequences. How to combine these with the methods of the present paper is an interesting topic for future work.
Another approach to understanding stable reasoning, in a style similar to the explanation-theoretic one, was developed by Dung [6] . In fact, Dung applies an argumentation-theoretic framework in which stable models can be understood as special kinds of 'sell-supporting' arguments. In this approach a very weak concept of proof, essentially only involving mo&ts ponens, is used. And again the role of negated atoms is highlighted: Dung's arguments are sets of negated atoms. D:mg's char~ctcrisation of stable reasoning is also applied to extended, but not to disjunctive, programs, and it can be derived t'rom the methods of this paper.
More recently, an argumentation semantics has been developed in [2] Ik~r so-called assmnpthm-based frameworks for del'ault reasoning in general. Stable models and other semantics for normal and extended programs are ¢haracterised in this setting. Again, logic program clauses are not identified with logical formulas (they may be identified with inference rules) and the notion of proof or 'deduction' i~ ,~ very weak one, involving essentially only a form of modus ponens. Whilst in the case of logic programs only negated atoms form allowed assumptions, the authors also develop a notion of stable set of assumptions that is defined for more general nonmonotonic theories. It remains to investigate how this concept of stability relates to negationstability discussed here.
Unlike the other approaches to studying stable i,al'erence mentioned above, we identify programs with sets of ordinary logical formulas, apply a standard logical notion of completeness, and treat the case of disjunctive programs as well. Unlike those approaches that make use of epistemic and modal logics (e.g. [16, 1923] ), ours is based on a familar, nonmodal, nonclassical logic. This is an important difference that may easily be overlooked. In particular, it means that we can characterise stable inference in logics having essentially the same logical vocabulary as that of logic programming, without needing to translate logic programs into a richer, modal language. Secondly, an advantage of our method is that it can be used to derive several of the known modal characterisations of stable inference. Fat instance, using Theorem I, and the well-known Giidel translation of H into modal S4, one obtains the embedding result of [23] as a simple corollary. Similarly, other embeddings of stable models into nonmonotonic modal logics. of the kind discussed in [ 16, 191 , can be derived from Theorem 1 using general results about modal embeddings of intermediate logics, as studied in {4].
Extensions and future work
We have explained stable inference as follows: the stable consequences of a program f7 are those sentences true in all (intuitionistically) complete and consistent extensions of I7 obtainable b_v addhg just negated atoms to EL By regarding those negated atoms as forming an explanans in the context of an explanatory framework, one may rela,, _ +p stable inference to a form of explanatory reasoning in intuitionistic logic H. For these purposes we can also take any logic stronger than H, providing it is properly contained in classical logic.
These results can be extended. We may equally allow I7 to be an extended logic program containing a new, strong negation operator, using the answer set semantics of (91. With the obvious modifications all of our results hold for extended programs, where intuitionistic !ogic is replaced by Nelson's constructive logic with strong negation [Xl] . Similarly, in place of intermediate logics we may consider their least strong negation extensions, formed by adding Nelson's negation and the axioms governing it: these are always conservative extensions (see e.g. Kracht [14] ). For the strong neation version of equilibrium logic, see 1241.
Future work may focus on applying these basic notions to more them to hk\ndle other kinds af semantics, and on studyi ill and implementation issues, Thanks to Michael Gelfond and Marcus Kracht for providing advice and encouragement. 1 am also grateful to the anonymous referees for their helpful remarks.
